Combinatorial Voter Control in Elections

Voter control problems model situations such as an external agent trying to affect the result of an election by adding voters, for example by convincing some voters to vote who would otherwise not attend the election. Traditionally, voters are added one at a time, with the goal of making a distinguished alternative win by adding a minimum number of voters. In this paper, we initiate the study of combinatorial variants of control by adding voters: In our setting, when we choose to add a voter~$v$, we also have to add a whole bundle $\kappa(v)$ of voters associated with $v$. We study the computational complexity of this problem for two of the most basic voting rules, namely the Plurality rule and the Condorcet rule.Comment: An extended abstract appears in MFCS 201

On the Introduction of an Agile, Temporary Workforce into a Tandem Queueing System

We consider a two-station tandem queueing system where customers arrive according to a Poisson process and must receive service at both stations before leaving the system. Neither queue is equipped with dedicated servers. Instead, we consider three scenarios for the fluctuations of workforce level. In the first, a decision-maker can increase and decrease the capacity as is deemed appropriate; the unrestricted case. In the other two cases, workers arrive randomly and can be rejected or allocated to either station. In one case the number of workers can then be reduced (the controlled capacity reduction case). In the other they leave randomly (the uncontrolled capacity reduction case). All servers are capable of working collaboratively on a single job and can work at either station as long as they remain in the system. We show in each scenario that all workers should be allocated to one queue or the other (never split between queues) and that they should serve exhaustively at one of the queues depending on the direction of an inequality. This extends previous studies on flexible systems to the case where the capacity varies over time. We then show in the unrestricted case that the optimal number of workers to have in the system is non-decreasing in the number of customers in either queue.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/47647/1/11134_2005_Article_2441.pd

Voting on Actions with Uncertain Outcomes

Abstract. We introduce a model for voting under uncertainty where a group of voters have to decide on a joint action to take, but the individual voters are uncertain about the current state of the world and thus about the effect that the chosen action would have. Each voter has preferences about what state they would like to see reached once the action has been executed. That is, we need to integrate two kinds of aggregation: beliefs regarding the current state and preferences regarding the next state.

Reformulation and Decomposition of Integer Programs

We examine ways to reformulate integer and mixed integer programs. Typically, but not exclusively, one reformulates so as to obtain stronger linear programming relaxations, and hence better bounds for use in a branch-and-bound based algorithm. First we cover reformulations based on decomposition, such as Lagrangean relaxation, the Dantzig-Wolfe reformulation and the resulting column generation and branch-and-price algorithms. This is followed by an examination of Benders' type algorithms based on projection. Finally we discuss extended formulations involving additional variables that are based on problem structure. These can often be used to provide strengthened a priori formulations. Reformulations obtained by adding cutting planes in the original variables are not treated here